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Unmanned Weapons Systems and Just Wars: The Psychological Dimension





This chapter explores the psychological impact of unmanned weapons systems on military decision making. Just war theory is used as a normative framework to evaluate whether decision making is morally acceptable before, during, and after conflict. We discuss the psychology of decision making at the strategic, operational and, tactical levels and question whether the novelty of unmanned weapons systems can bias the consideration of ethics during conflict. We provide theoretical hypotheses that describe how the possession of unmanned weapons systems may influence military decisions. We query whether military decision makers have an appropriate level of understanding and expertise in using these systems; importantly when considering the trade-off between short-term tactical advantage and long-term strategic goals, and offer recommendations for research. 

DEFINING ETHICS AND TECHNOLOGY

Prior to a more definitive analysis of the psychology of decision making, it is important to outline the theoretical foundation upon which this chapter is based. By their very nature wars and violent conflict equate to death and destruction, yet society tries to regulate the level of violence through consideration of internationally regarded ethical, moral, and legal normative standards. Just war theory (JWT: also known as the ‘laws of war’, Evans, 2005) is a centuries-old normative framework of moral standards for how decisions about conflict ought to be taken before, during and after war. These standards are a ‘heuristic tool, providing the set of moral criteria that should inform decisions on whether to go to war and, if so, how it should be fought’ (Evans, 2005: 11); and their principles have been woven into various international treaties of law (e.g. Hague Conventions 1907; Geneva Conventions 1949). For example the ad bellum principle of ‘last resort’ is enshrined in Article 1 of the Hague Convention (III; 1907) by requiring ‘reasoned declaration of war or an ultimatum’; and the UK Ministry of Defence outlines in bello principles in the ‘Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict’ (2004) as ‘a violation of the law of armed conflict by the armed forces of a state involves the international responsibility of that state’ (Joint Service Publication 383, 2004: 4). The concept of jus post bellum is more recent (Orend 2000) but provides a useful addition to JWT in the context of contemporary international intervention. It is not the intention of the authors to provide a detailed critique of JWT. But for the purposes of this chapter we take it to define a set of moral standards that accept that, although conflict between states is inevitable, global society should try at least to keep conflict as humane, proportionate, and just as possible. 

With this consideration of ‘just wars’ in mind, this chapter provides a psychological discussion of military decision making and the use of contemporary unmanned weapons systems (UWS). These are novel and revolutionary as they provide the military capability to send technology into conflict independent of direct human contact. They differ from other means of long range force projection because of their ability to combine sustained over-watch with immediate destructive effects. UWS are used for a variety of tasks, from third party targeting to reconnaissance and intelligence gathering (Kurkcu, Erhan & Umut, 2012). Examples of such systems include the MQ1-Predator drone equipped with hellfire missiles  and MQ-9 Reaper with laser-guided bombs.  

We ask whether there has been sufficient time for military decision makers to develop expertise and fully understand the short, medium, and long-term effects of UWS on the battlefield. This chapter’s argument is theoretical in scope and, by setting up opposing hypotheses against each other, intentionally provocative in nature. It is based upon two grounding principles. Firstly, actions taken during conflict should be, as far as possible,  just. This is something that, as outlined above, is reflected through various international legal treaties on how conflict ought to be conducted. Secondly, UWS are a relatively novel technology. Thus, although UWS can be highly advantageous for enabling effective short-term precision strikes, from a psychological dimension we query whether military decision makers yet fully understand the short, medium, and long-term consequences of their use. Fundamentally, a war should be fought as morally as possible, but does our relative inexperience of using UWS impede the ability to make objective ‘just’ decisions during conflict? The proliferation of such systems is occurring exponentially; A recent report for the US Congress stated that they ‘are expected to take on every type of mission currently flown by manned aircraft’ (Gertler, 2012: 6) and the global investment in unmanned technology is on the rise with a predicted compound annual growth rate of 4.4% between 2012 and 2022 across North America, Europe, Asia, Middle East, Latin America, and Africa (Strategic Defence Intelligence, January 2013). Therefore, as with any modern technology it is important to ensure that this does not occur in the absence of objective and reasoned human comprehension of the limits to their use.

THEORETICAL HYPOTHESES FOR HOW THE USE OF UNMANNED WEAPONS SYSTEMS MAY INFLUENCE THE ‘JUST’ CONSIDERATION OF DECISIONS ON CONFLICT

We will now outline 3 pairs of theoretical and opposing hypotheses (Table 1) that we have established following a psychological consideration of decision making: two for each stage of war (i.e. ad bellum, in bello, post bellum). The hypotheses are coupled during each stage of war as counter-hypotheses, i.e. one hypothesis suggests UWS can make war more just, whereas the other suggests UWS make war less just. Before exploring these in more detail however, we will firstly provide some background on the psychology of decision making.

Psychology of decision making

A decision is the commitment to a course of action that is taken in order to achieve a desired goal (Yates, 2003). The process of making a decision involves choosing between potential courses of action (i.e. options) within an uncertain environment (Hastie, 2001). Decision makers must first establish their situation awareness, formulate, recognise, and trade-off potential plans of action, and then finally execute their choice (van den Heuvel, Alison & Crego, 2012). In an ideal environment, decision makers use pure rationality (i.e. expected utility theory) to analyse objectively and select the optimal option available (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947). Yet real-world decision making is bounded by environmental pressures, such as time pressure and ambiguity (Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999; Souchon, Cabagno, Traclet, Trouilloud, & Maio, 2009), which can lead to cognitive overload and poor decision making (Renkl, Hilbert & Schworm, 2008). Pressures within the decision making environment make option processing and trade-off more difficult and so decision makers will attempt to avoid or delay their choice (Anderson, 2003; van den Heuvel, Alison & Crego, 2012) or rely on ‘cognitive shortcuts’ and ‘heuristics’ that can bias decision outcomes (DiBonaventura & Chapman, 2008; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). For example both the ‘representative’ heuristic (assume high commonality between prototypical entities) and ‘confirmation bias’ (search for cues in the environment which confirm one’s assumption) can make the decision maker subjectively in favour of a predetermined option (Kellogg, 1995; Lord, Ross & Lepper, 1979). Decision making in uncertain environments must therefore be timely but not degraded by biased processing.

When a person is experienced in a decision domain they are able to make efficient and intuitive decisions even whilst placed under extreme pressure (Klein, 1998). The dual-process model describes how individuals make sense of information via both intuitive (innate, non-taxing) and analytic (effortful, systematic) processing. When an individual is experienced in the decision domain, then they possess accurate intuitive skills known as domain-specific expertise (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Kahneman & Klein, 2009). Theories on metacognition (i.e., thinking about one’s thinking) distinguish between three forms of expertise (Schraw & Moshman, 2005). At a basic level a novice possesses ‘declarative knowledge’ about what the decision domain is (e.g. “I know what an UWS is”). At the middle level, a competent decision maker holds ‘procedural knowledge’ on how to execute choice (e.g. “I know how to use an UWS”). And finally, at an expert level, the decision maker has ‘conditional knowledge’ about both when and why an action is appropriate (e.g. “I know when and why I should fly an UWS”). In other words, an expert can make rapid decisions under extreme pressure, yet is able to maintain a rational and considered understanding of why and when certain courses of action are appropriate.  Decision making improves as metacognitive knowledge increases.

Metacognition is the fundamental goal of all learning and the cornerstone of expertise (White & Frederiksen, 2005). It is needed for effective decision making as it allows experts to plan, monitor and evaluate their choice, despite operating under high environmental and cognitive pressure (Akturk & Sahin, 2011). In order to achieve metacognitive expertise, a learner must plan, monitor, and evaluate their learning and actions by practicing in the domain-specific environment (Schraw & Moshman, 2005). When choice environments are uncertain, time pressured, and cognitively overloading, it is important that decision makers have the opportunity to develop expertise to be effective. This chapter assumes that the relative novelty of UWS means that there is a reduced level of expertise in their application. Although new technologies have the potential to improve decision making, there is a risk that decision makers do not fully understand the short, medium, and long-term consequences of their use. This leads us to consider whether using UWS may make decisions on conflict more or less morally just.

Ad bellum (before war)

According to JWT, conflict should only occur if there is just cause (i.e. self-defence or counter-action to punish severe actions that endangered innocent life), right intention (i.e. must only act in order to achieve this cause), and as a last resort (i.e. all peaceful options have been exhausted and failed) (Orend, 2008). Political decision makers must have a reasonable and just rationale for why they enter conflict with another state. Our first two theoretical counter-hypotheses consider how the availability of UWS as a potential option in the decision making process may influence choice outcome. Namely, whether the decision to enter conflict becomes more likely when UWS are an option; or whether the decision to enter conflict becomes less or no more likely when UWS are an option?

When individuals consider option-based decisions (e.g. whether to enter conflict or not) then they will try to trade off their options to select the one with the most attractive anticipated outcome(s) (Kahneman, 2003). They attempt to both maximise the potential gains from their choice, whilst also minimising losses (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). In fact decision makers take considerably more effort in trying to minimise anticipated losses than they do to maximise gains: a psychological phenomenon known as loss aversion (Kahneman, 2003). The salient negative emotional impact of losing feels stronger than the positive emotional impact of an equal win; which makes individuals more risk taking when they anticipate potential for loss (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). When considering ‘do or don’t act’ decisions whereby one is deliberating over whether to take a course of action or not (e.g. decision to enter conflict or not?), decision makers are further more likely to avoid action; a psychological phenomenon known as ‘omission bias’ (Baron & Ritov, 1993). The combined effect of these two phenomena is that individuals try to avoid taking action (i.e. omission bias) and this desire to avoid action can be increased by any associated and emotionally salient potential for loss (i.e. loss aversion). The exception is when potential loss is anchored to not acting which can make decision makers more likely to take action.

In order to provide a worked example for how psychological phenomena such as loss aversion and omission bias may influence military decision making, we will discuss the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Despite the uncertainty and limited intelligence surrounding Iraq’s potential possession of weapons of mass destruction, a decision was made to enter conflict. Potential loss was associated to not acting and thus decision makers were (arguably) biased to favour conflict. Chan (2012) argued that loss aversion motivates military choice as leaders prefer to ‘gamble for recovery’ than accept (potential) defeat or harm. The rationale for entering conflict could therefore have been motivated by loss aversion anchored to potential harm from inaction. In addition, decision makers also consider anticipated positive outcomes of their choice and thus these must be considered in tandem. Indeed spreading democracy was seen as a potential positive outcome and the possession of UWS may have made action seem less risky due to perceived military dominance. UWS make war seem less dangerous to the public as combatants from home nations are not put in direct danger. Indeed, public opinion and emotional reactions are one of the largest influences on political decision making (Muller, 2011) especially when facing a foreign policy crisis (Knecht & Weatherford, 2006). Singer (2008) has warned how removing the soldier from the frontline may make war more palatable to the public due to the reduced risk of allied loss of life. There is thus a danger that UWS may make war seem less dangerous to the public. From an ad bellum just war perspective, conflict is therefore more likely due to salient loss aversive motivations that are exaggerated by anticipated ethnocentric gains from utilising UWS.

An alternative view is that the possession of UWS has no effect on the likelihood of conflict or may even reduce its likelihood by encouraging diplomatic debate. Arkin (2009) has suggested that the geopolitical asymmetry in the possession of new technologies may indirectly reduce the chances of future conflict. He suggests that those states or actors who lack UWS will proactively favour diplomacy rather than risk drone attacks. Furthermore, the ethnocentric advantages outlined above may not be all that impactful. Indeed, the salient impact of potential loss is weighted more heavily than gains and so public perceptions may have little influence. Specifically, the advantages in improving the accuracy of complex attacks (Schulzke, 2011; Sharkey, 2008), and for overcoming human errors associated with fear, fatigue, and resistance to killing (Daddis, 2004; Grossman, 1995; Olsen, Pallesen, & Eid, 2010) does not mean that allied combatants are free from harm. Currently no war can be fought from complete remoteness and thus rudimentary weapons (such as improvised explosive devices) can cause significant casualties to those who remain on the frontline (Human Rights Watch, 2008). Technological innovation is also available to a wide range of actors in modern conflict as shown by the use of smart phones in the Mumbai bombings (Goodman, 2011) and Hezbollah’s claimed ownership of a rudimentary drone (BBC, 11 October 2012). As such, the motivation for entering conflict and biasing (or disregarding) just war considerations due to the possession of UWS is open to debate.

Thus our two counter-hypotheses are as follows. Firstly, UWS can make war more likely as they act to strengthen loss aversive motivations via anticipated positive outcomes associated with military dominance and public support. Yet equally, UWS can deter ad bellum decisions to enter conflict by making diplomacy more favourable in the eyes of the opposition and the persistent risks still associated with conflict. Both of these hypotheses are counter-intuitive and purely theoretical. As UWS are a relatively new capability, with modern systems such as Predator and Reaper drones only having played a predominant role in international conflict since the turn of the century (Singer, 2009), experience with how UWS influence decision making is limited. Ad bellum decisions are motivated by risk assessment, trade-off, and cost benefit analysis, which can be psychologically influenced by anticipated positive and negative consequences (Kahneman, 2003). Cumulatively, cognitive biases can bias the rational consideration of JWT; something that is currently poorly measured due to their relatively recent advancement and thus needs empirical attention.

In Bello (during war)

Actions taken during conflict ought to be just (Evans, 2005). The in bello principle of discrimination requires that lethal force effectively discriminates between legitimate targets and innocent civilians. The application of JWT during war therefore aims to moderate how extreme the acts of violence taken during conflict are. Our two opposing hypotheses in bello are that: (i) use of force during conflict is more extreme when possessing UWS; and conversely that (ii) use of force during conflict is less extreme when possessing UWS.

Critics of UWS argue that the relative deprivation of sensory cues available to the remote operator mean that decisions taken during conflict cannot be objective or discriminative (Sharkey, 2008; Sparrow, 2007). UWS cockpits, in comparison to traditional manned aircraft, lack the peripheral visual, haptic, and auditory cues usually experienced in live flight (Kurkcu, Erhan & Umut, 2012). The limitation of sensory cues can degrade the ability of the operator to conduct discriminative lethal force by increasing uncertainty and complexity; when a task is complex, then the ability to process sensory cues decreases (Sherman, Groom, Ehrenberg & Klauer, 2003). The separation of pilots from the usual sensory cues found in standard aircraft has been highlighted as an unprecedented psychological factor that can influence decision making (Reardon, 2013). As described earlier, domain-specific expertise can help individuals cope with complexity and make efficient decisions (Kahneman, 2003). Yet UWS are relatively novel and developing exponentially and thus it is important to question whether their operators yet possess sufficient expertise to cope with complexity. 

The negative impact of complexity on decision tasks is especially of note when decisions require ethical consideration due to the potential loss of human life. It is important that decision makers hold a metacognitive awareness of the implications of their actions. They must understand not only how to use UWS, but under what conditions and boundaries their use is appropriate. Of course it is acknowledged that a decision making team is involved in these choices, but the operators themselves must also possess an awareness of rationale for their own moral accountability. Metacognition makes decision making more effective and importantly provides individuals with a salient rationale that can justify their actions. This is something that would no doubt be of benefit to the UWS operators who, like manned aircraft pilots, have been found to be at risk of mental health problems following combat (Otto & Webber, 2013). Complex environments impede an individual’s ability to recall events accurately; causing them to generate inaccurate and stereotypical-consistent memories (Sherman, et al., 2003). Domain-specific metacognitive expertise would help to alleviate this effect.

Royakkers and van Est (2010) argue that the use of automation during conflict can also induce moral disengagement in the ‘human operator’ of such systems, which can have problems for discrimination. Moral disengagement, they argue, increases ‘remote violence’ due to the physical and psychological distance between the operator and the battlefield and can induce dehumanisation and detachment in lethal force decisions (Bandura, 1986; Detert, Trevin & Sweitzer, 2008). Although moral disengagement may be tactically useful for reducing resistance to killing in soldiers, it can impede battlefield effectiveness and cause negative psychological implications after returning to civilian life (Holmes, 2003; Lindlaw, 2008). It also raises ethical concerns over the soldier’s awareness of the consequences of their actions; the death of another human being (Sparrow, 2009). Furthermore, it is only more recently that the mental health of UWS operators has created debate and discussion (Otto & Webber, 2013; Reardon, 2013) indicating a paucity of past consideration for their psychological effects. UWS operators are thus at risk to a triple-pressure effect on their ability to make ethical discriminative decisions in bello due to the deprivation of sensory cues; increased cognitive complexity; and impeded rationale and recall. 

UWS may also impede the ability to judge whether actions taken during conflict are ’proportionate’ (i.e. whether the potential for collateral damage is proportional to potential military gain) and ‘necessary’ (i.e. the minimum force necessary to achieve aims) (Orend, 2008). Singer (2008) has suggested that UWS create an overwhelming and unfair asymmetric advantage in favour of those who possess them; thus their use is neither proportionate nor necessary. There is currently very little information on the sheer magnitude of suffering or collateral cost caused by these systems and thus this is a contentious issue with limited data upon which to judge it (Asaro, 2006). Put simply, UWS have not been around long enough for there to an objective understanding of their implications; both in terms of the proportionality of their potential collateral damage (e.g. loss of property and/or life) and whether they are ‘necessary’ tools to achieve strategic military aims. Indeed, UWS may be counterintuitive in the long-term if the use of these systems creates opposition from innocent civilians who are ‘intervened upon’ in the conflict zone (e.g. civilians in Afghanistan). 

From an alternative perspective, UWS may increase ethical considerations of decisions taken during conflict. Moral disengagement could in fact be useful for overcoming human errors associated with decision inertia (the failure to execute a choice due to redundant deliberation). When a decision maker feels accountable and uncertain about the fallout of their decisions in ambiguous and high stakes environments, they will try and avoid making a decision (Anderson, 2003). Rather than commit to a choice, they fail to implement action (van den Heuvel, Alison & Crego, 2012). This is due to the negative affect and anticipated regret associated with making the wrong choice (Inman & Zeelenberg, 2002), and may manifest behaviourally as omission (when the decision is ignored) (Anderson, 2003), choice deferral (when decisions are delayed until further information is acquired) (Kopylov, 2009), inaction inertia (when the decision is delayed because of a missed opportunity) (O’Keefe & Wright, 2010), or implementation failure (when a decision may be made but no action taken) (van den Heuvel, Alison & Crego, 2012). Ultimately, the experience and anticipation of uncertainty and negative emotions can either temporarily or permanently prevent decisive action (van den Heuvel, Alison & Power, 2012). Thus remote weapon technologies may indirectly assist decision making as operators are not distracted by deliberation on the emotionally salient and uncertain battlefield.

UWS may also reflect the first step in increasing ethical considerations during conflict by completely removing humans from the frontline. Proponents of unmanned technologies argue that transferring lethal targeting responsibilities to autonomous systems can improve the discrimination of targets (Schulzke, 2011; Arkin, 2007). This is because they are free from cognitive load limitations and can develop almost immediate situation awareness by rapidly amalgamating a variety of disparate sensory information. For example, autonomous systems have been developed that can selectively sense and recognise enemy tanks (Dougherty, 2010). It is worth noting that the potential for autonomous systems is separate to the practicality of remote systems as a human must, from an ethical perspective, remain in the loop to make life and death decisions delivered by remote systems. Yet, arguably, the increased use of autonomous systems in the future may make strikes on non-human targets free from human error.

In summary, the following may usefully provide criteria by which one might judge the operational and ethical appropriateness of UWS during conflict: (i) the ability to define and detect a civilian; (ii) the capacity to quantify collateral damage relative to military gain; and (iii) the superiority of the system over manned human cognition. Kurkcu, Erhan & Umut (2012) analysed the impact of UWS on cognitive demands and operation tempo and advised against their use in unplanned, immediate, multi-player or situation assessment-dependent missions, due to their potential for self-jamming (i.e. when electronic attacks interfere with UWS’ own electronic communications with command and control), poor sensor discrimination, and an inability to respond to requests for specified information. This suggests that human cognition needs to remain central in the design, development, and utilisation of UWS if they are to be effective; leaving aside any ethical considerations the technology is simply not advanced enough to devolve life and death decisions to. Importantly, if UWS make military decision making less just, then their potential advantages are outweighed by the potential disadvantages caused by their misapplication.

Post bellum (after war)

So far, we have discussed the potential ethical implications of UWS on decision making before and during conflict. It is also important to consider the ultimate post bellum consideration of whether actions taken in the present may enhance or hinder superordinate long-term goals. The two theoretical counter-hypotheses now discussed are whether: (i) UWS are counterintuitive to long-term strategic goals and perpetuate conflict; or alternatively (ii) UWS facilitate long-term strategic goals and facilitate peace. 

The ultimate goal of any conflict is to reach a resolution and establish peace. This post bellum consideration underpins the superordinate aim of ‘population-centric’ warfare (i.e. whoever wins support of the local population will ultimately win the war) (Gentile, 2009). Population-centric approaches to war are advantageous (Kilcullen, 2006) and offer counterinsurgency strategies for gaining local civilian support (Umit & Aydinli, 2003). For example, international forces operating in Libya in 2012 were able to work effectively alongside and with rebel forces due to their collaborative approach and, likewise, it is a strategy utilised by extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda who used the popular uprising against the regime in Yemen to gain Islamist support in the south (Binnie, 2012). An important strategic question is whether UWS enhance or inhibit population-centric strategies. If they prevent the peace-focussed, long-term strategic aim of population-centric warfare, then can their use be justified?

Very little published research has so far uncovered the direct impact of UWS on population-centric outcomes. UWS are, inevitably and by definition, unmanned, and thus they reduce the opportunity to engage with civilian populations. Singer (2009: 306) has highlighted how communicating to civilian populations during conflict is ‘hugely important, to the overall ‘war of ideas’ that we are fighting against radical groups and their own propaganda and recruiting efforts’. Indeed political communication, such as diplomatic channels and open media, are more prevalent in democratically peaceful states (Choi & James, 2008) and research on civilian support for national authorities (such as the police) have found that support increases when community values are upheld and communication is non-threatening between the authorities and the public (Merry, Power, McManus & Alison, 2012). The more cohesive, trusting, and secure a state is, the lower the risk of future violence and extremist behaviour (Albrecht, 2006). Communication between combatants and those civilians who are ‘intervened upon’ is therefore important for long-term peacekeeping goals as it helps to facilitate cohesion, trust, and security. The removal of the soldier from the front line does not align with population-centric goals as it prevents the opportunity for open engagement and knowledge exchange. 
 
A further long-term consideration for the use of UWS is with regards to their potential for inducing anti-intervention sentiment. Singer (2009: 306) has warned how poor communication during hostilities can produce ‘a cloud of anger and misperceptions’ in the local community, causing otherwise apathetic civilians to be dragged into conflict reluctantly. From a Western standpoint on recent conflict, this may indirectly create a breeding ground for recruitment and radicalisation of anti-intervention and extremist support. Although there is little empirical data to explain increased extremist support with confidence, some reports associate it with a rise in the number of drone attacks. Survey data in Pakistan associated an increase use of drones with support for extremist organisations (Campbell & O’Hanlon, 2009). Of the 60 reported drone attacks in Pakistan between 2006 and 2009, it was reported that 687 civilians were killed compared to only 14 Al-Qaeda targets (Ghosh & Thompson, 2009) and it has been estimated that just 2 per cent of those killed by drones are high-value targets (Stanford/NYU, 2012). Concurrently, the past decade has seen a sharp increase in anti-intervention sentiment among the ‘intervened upon’ population in Pakistan (Williams, 2010). A survey on those living in the FATA region of Pakistan found that 84 per cent opposed US intervention, 76 per cent opposed drone attacks, and 49 per cent believed that drones mainly killed civilians (Bergen, Doherty & Ballen, 2010). It appears that the relative novelty of UWS not only biases the decision making of those who possess these systems but further impedes understanding and facilitates resistance from those civilians who are at risk of becoming collateral damage.

Not only is negative sentiment a problem for generating support for military intervention, but in extreme cases it could increase the desire for revenge (Mayer, 2009). Individuals will often take extreme risks to defend their communities when threatened (Lakatos, 2010) which can lead to spiralling victim-avenger cycles of aggression (Schulzke, 2011). When individuals feel wronged, the desire for an understanding of why it has happened is stronger than the desire to inflict equivocal harm (Gollwitzer, Meder & Schmitt, 2011). Yet if there is no way to find understanding due to, for example a lack of or poor communication between the perpetrator and the victim, then revenge becomes a more attractive option. The desire for revenge is further exacerbated by ‘just-world’ thinking where feelings of hate are channelled into proactive violent behaviour towards the perceived deserving party (Staub, 1996; Sternberg, 2003). When a desire for revenge is coupled with a lack of accessibility to express grievances in a constructive manner because of an inability to communicate with those causing distress, then this can facilitate destructive paths of expression (Tyler, 1994). Therefore, UWS risk an environment of festering alienation, persecution, and injustice, and as such, their very use may be counterproductive to the long-term strategic aims of the most recent wars on sectarian violence.

The inevitable alternative argument is that survey data may be biased. Williams (2010) reviewed a variety of surveys and concluded that although anti-American sentiment in response to drone attacks was high in Pakistan, those who resided within the FATA tribal targeted areas were actually more tolerant and accepted drones as a necessary measure. It appeared that the risk of drone attacks was the least-worst option when living under the constant threat of terrorist organisations and so UWS may in fact facilitate long-term superordinate goals. It has been highlighted how civilian deaths in Afghanistan in 2011 increased for the fifth consecutive year, yet 77 per cent of them were attributed to Taliban and anti-government forces (UN News Centre, Feb 2012). Furthermore, between 2007 and 2009 anti-intervention sentiment in Pakistan increased; however opposition to Al-Qaeda also increased from 16 to 28 per cent (Campbell & O’Hanlon, 2009). This creates a confusing picture for the current status of survey data in the ‘intervened upon’ regions which highlights the novice understanding of the long-term implications of UWS. In-depth empirical and validated analysis is therefore needed to extrapolate findings and explicitly investigate the direct effects of UWS on the attitudes and perceptions of the ‘intervened upon’. This is an integral step in evaluating the use of UWS to assess whether they are consistent with transcendent, long-term strategic goals and therefore just tools for conflict.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 

This chapter considers that the level of understanding that exists on the impact of UWS on strategic, operational and tactical military decision making. Three pairs of theoretical hypotheses (Table 1) are outlined to encourage future research to explore the impact of UWS on just wars. A combination of think-tanks, technologists, expert-opinions  and psychological experiments utilising methods such as cognitive task analysis and immersive simulated learning environments (Alison, van den Heuvel, Waring, et al., 2013), could help to unpack these theoretical hypotheses and guide future policy regarding their use. For example, there are restrictive policies in place for other types of weapons which limit or ban their use due to the potential for indiscriminate force (CCWC, 2001), such as non-detectable fragments (Protocol I) and mines (Protocol II). It is important to test how UWS influence conflict to ensure their appropriate use. It has already been suggested that UWS should be restricted to pre-planned, non-human targets, and that their use during time sensitive targeting is inappropriate (Kurkcu, Erhan & Umut, 2012), and there has been an increased effort over recent years to assess the implications of UWS objectively. For example, in October 2012 the UK Parliament set up an All Party Parliamentary Group on Drones to explore the domestic, international, military and civilian use of unmanned systems (APPG 2012); and in January 2013 the UN launched an inquiry into the human rights implications and civilian impact of the use of drones and targeted killing (UN, 2013).

As for the long-term consequences of digitalised warfare on those in the intervened upon communities, psychological research needs to be conducted with these affected communities ‘in the field’ in a valid, empirical and objective way; utilising methods such as semi-structured interviewing, validated attitude scales and coding practices with inter-rater reliability (i.e. coding by multiple researchers to remove the potential for biased conclusions). This is a challenge faced by researchers operating in conflict zones due to issues surrounding ethics and informed consent, the risk to the researcher, and also limitations in funding (Gagliardone & Stemlau, 2008). Yet it is vitally important to conduct studies to ensure that the short and medium-term tactical advantage of UWS does not come at the expense of longer-term strategic goals. An integral push in such research to explore the hypotheses outlined in this chapter will assist the international community in evaluating the effectiveness of new technologies and further in understanding when and, importantly, when not to utilise UWS in combat.
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Influence of UWS on decision making	Reason why
Ad bellum
The decision to enter conflict becomes more likely 	UWS are perceived as a dominant and winning technology; especially when coupled with loss aversive motivationsThere is increased public support for conflict due to perceptions of reduced ethnocentric risk of harm
The decision to enter conflict becomes less or no more likely	Asymmetric dominance increases preference for diplomatic discussionUWS are not perceived as overwhelmingly dominant and so have little or no effect on decision making
In bello
Use of force during conflict becomes more extreme 	There is reduced ability to discriminate between targets (poor sensory information; increased complexity; biased situation recall)There is uncertainty over whether they are proportional or necessary weapons as their short and long-term impact is unknownRemoving lethal force decisions from the frontline can induce moral disengagement and more extreme violence
Use of force during conflict becomes less extreme 	Moral disengagement can foster more analytical and ethical decision makingThe next generation of more autonomous systems can selectively and accurately discriminate between targets
Post bellum
UWS are counterintuitive to long-term strategic aims and perpetuate conflict 	They reduce the number of soldiers on the frontline which limits opportunity to establish trust and cohesion with intervened upon communitiesThey can increase anti-intervention sentiment and desire for revenge in intervened upon communitiesThey can increase the prevalence of radicalisation and extremist support in intervened upon communities
UWS facilitate long-term strategic aims and facilitate peace	They are a necessary and ‘least-worst’ option to eradicate extremists within targeted regions
Table 1: Summary of theory-driven hypotheses on how UWS may influence the ‘just’ consideration of conflict before, during, and after war
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